Maryland Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 4

Article 8

May a Spendthrift Interest Be Reached for Alimony,
or Support? - Bauernschmidt v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co.

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Conflicts of Law Commons
Recommended Citation
May a Spendthrift Interest Be Reached for Alimony, or Support? - Bauernschmidt v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 4 Md. L. Rev. 417 (1940)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol4/iss4/8

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

1940]

BAUERNSCHMIDT v. SAFE DEP. & TR. CO.

417

MAY A SPENDTHRIFT INTEREST BE REACHED
FOR ALIMONY, OR SUPPORT?
Bauernschmidt v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.'
One N. B., a resident of California, sued out a writ of
foreign attachment in Baltimore City against her husband
W. B. and garnisheed the Trust Company. The basis of the
attachment by N. B. was a claim of $17,641.90 alleged to be
due her under a decree for separate maintenance by the
Superior Court of California for Los Angeles County. The
Trust Company answered that under the will of the husband's ancestors they were but trustees of a spendthrift
trust and therefore had no assets of the husband which
were open or subject to garnishment. In order to avoid
the obstacle of the general immunity to attachment of income from spendthrift trusts, the plaintiff, according to the
Court, invoked the California rule that the separation decree was the equivalent of an award of alimony and that in
California the income of a spendthrift trust may be reached
in order to satisfy a claim for alimony.2 The Court of
Appeals held that in Maryland the decree of the California
Court could not be considered as an alimony award but
was a debt of record and said "there is no need to discuss
the decisions elsewhere, of the rights of the wife of a spendthrift cestui que trust."'
The case raises vital issues in two important branches
of law. In the field of Conflict of Laws, the decision pre1 176 Md. 351, 4 A. (2d) 712 (1939).
The same case is noted in the following casenote on another point.
2
Apparently the plaintiff so argued, for early in the Court's opinion there
appears the following language, "To overcome this obstacle in the decisions of this court that Income from a spendthrift trust could not be
reached with respect to attachments of income from spendthrift trusts,
the plaintiff invokes the rule of comity between the States, and alms to
apply here the rule In California that there is an exception In favor of
decrees for alimony." However, this does not appear to have been the
rule in California; for, quite to the contrary, the Courts of that state
had held that income from a spendthrift trust was not open to a wife's
suit for support. See San Diego Trust and Savings Bank v. Heustis, 121
Cal. A. 675, 10 P. (2d) 158 (1932) ; Kelly v. Kelly, 11 Cal. (2d) 356, 79 P.
(2d) 1059 (Cal. 1938); and four cases all of the same name, Canfield v.
Security First Nat. Bank, 8 Cal. A. (2d) 277, 48 P. (2d) 133 (1935) ; 77
P. (2d) 857 (Cal. 1938) ; 77 P. (2d) 866 (Cal. 1938) ; 13 Cal. (2d) 1, 87 P.
(2d) 830 (1939) ; 13 Cal. (2d) 35, 87 P. (2d) 847 (1939).
It would seem
that plaintiff should have relied on the California decree as establishing
a valid claim for support, and recognized that Maryland law would
determine whether a Maryland spendthrift trust could be reached, arguing
that Maryland law should allow it to be reached for this purpose.
'4 A. (2d) 712, 714 (Md. 1939).
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sents the question whether Maryland will treat as alimony
an award of money by a California decree confirming a
separation agreement which was effective as an award of
alimony in California, when the Maryland Courts have
failed to consider such an agreement rendered in Maryland
as the equivalent of an award of alimony. 4 In the field of
Trusts, the decision opens, by indirection at least, the question of the amenability of income from a spendthrift trust
to a suit by the wife for alimony, or to a suit by the wife
or child for support against the beneficiary of the trust.5
As to the Trusts problem, the Court of Appeals opened
its argument with the statement that spendthrift trusts
are not subject in Maryland to attachment, execution, assignment, or anticipation. In support of this premise the
Court cited five cases.6 However, each of the cases cited,
having facts which involved only general creditors, involved mere statements of the general rule that income
from spendthrift trusts is not within reach of the creditors
of the beneficiary. Accordingly, these cases were not determinative of any consideration of the rights of a wife or
child to reach that income for their support under the
special doctrines allowing particular classes of claimants
to reach such an interest.
Actually, the Court, in the words quoted above, seems
to have avoided the issue as to whether the income from
such trusts was reachable by a wife suing for alimony, on
the basis that the decree of the California Court could7
not be considered in Maryland as an award of alimony.
Without comment as to whether this was justified, it would
appear that the Maryland law as to the rights of a wife or
child to reach a spendthrift interest is left undetermined.
The weight of judicial authority, the Restatement of the
Law of Trusts, text writers, and law review articles all
favor the proposition that in an action by a wife or by a
child for support against the beneficiary of a spendthrift
trust the public will demands that the wife or child shall
IDickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387, 58 A. L. R. 634 (1928);
Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929).
r The present case note is concerned only with the second issue, namely,
the problem raised in the field of trusts. As to the question raised in the
field of Conflict of Laws, see the following casenote.
6 Smith and Son v. Towers, Garnishee, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497, 15 A. 92, 9
Am. St. Rep. 398 (1888) ; Reid v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 86 Md. 464,
38 A. 899 (1897): Jackson Square Assn. v. Bartlett, 95 Md. 661, 53 A. 426,
93 Am. St. Rep. 416 (1902); Safe D. and T. Co. v. Ind. Brewing Assoc., 127
Md. 463, 96 A. 617 (1916); Johnson v. Stringer, 158 Md. 315, 148 A. 447
(1930).
7 See notes 3 and 4, 8upra.
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recover.' The wife and child represent but one of several
classes of claimants which have been thought capable of
subjecting income from a spendthrift trust to their respective claims against the beneficiary.' There is authority that the interest of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust
may be reached by the government for taxes; 10 creditors
who have furnished necessaries to the beneficiary;" and
persons who have conferred some benefit upon the beneficiary's interest in the trust estate. 2 Professor Scott adds
that tort creditors also should be able to reach the interest
of the beneficiary. 3
That which is common to all of those instances wherein
it is generally thought that the income of such trusts is
reachable is the factor of public policy. While the particular theories advanced in each case or group of cases
may be different from that advanced in the other cases or
group of cases nevertheless the "inarticulate major premise" in all the decisions is the demand of social policy.
Professor Scott reasons that "when one comes to examine
the question of public policy in regard to spendthrift trusts
aGRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1936) Sec. 333; RESTATEMENT OF
TRUSTS (1935) Sec. 157; ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) Sec. 157; Brown, Rights of
Creditors of Beneficiary of Spendthrift Trusts (1922), 21 Calif. L. Rev.
142; England v. England, 223 I1. App. 549 (I1., 1922): Eaton v. Lovering,
81 N. H. 275, 125 A. 433, 35 A. L. R. 1034 (1924) ; In Re Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802, 52 A. L. R. 1251 (1927). Contra, see Buckman v. Buckman, 294 Mass. 214, 200 N. E. 918, 104 A. L. R. 744 (1936);
San Diego Trust and Savings Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal. A. 675, 10 P. (2d)
158 (1932) ; Cf. Canfield v. Security First Nat. Bank, 8 Cal. A. (2d) 277,
48 P. (2d) 133 (1935) ; In Re Fitzgerald (1904) 1 Ch. 573; Oberndorf v.
Farmer's Loan and Trust Co.. 208 N. Y. 367, 102 N. E. 534 (1913) ; Pruyn v.
Sears, 161 N. Y. Supp. 58, 96 Misc. 200 (1916); Thomas v. Thomas, 112
Pa. S. 598, 172 A. 36 (1934) ; Keller v. Keller, 284 Ill. App. 198, 1 N. E.
(2d) 773 (1936).
Cf. Note (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 410; and Note (1928)
76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 220. The cases of In Re Jones' Estate, 48 A. 865
(Pa. 1901) and Schuster's Estate, 26 Pa. Dist. Rep. 232 (1917) were homologous decisions in that they upheld payment by a trustee of funds from
spendthrift trust to the wife on order of the beneficiary.
9RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) Sec. 157; SCOTT, TRUSTS, (1939) See. 157.
In a caveat to this section the RESTATEMENT admonishes that these two
classes plus that of the wife and child are not necessarily the only claimants who may reach the income from the fund.
11In Re Rosenberg's Will, 269 N. Y. 247, 199 N. E. 206, 298 U. S. 669, 56
S. Ct. 834, 80 L. Ed. 1392, (1935); as to powers of the Alien Property
Custodian to reach the income see Keppelmann v. Palmer, 91 N. J. E. 67,
108 A. 432 (1919), cert. denied, 252 U. S. 581, 40 S. Ct. 392, 64 L. Ed. 727
(1920).
11 Cooper v. Carter, 145 Mo. App. 387, 129 S. W. 224 (1910). Scott cites
Pole v. Pietsch, 61 Md. 570 (1884). That was a discretionary trust and
the evidence showed bad faith in the exercise of the discretion. Matter of
Berrien, 264 N. Y. Supp. 593 (1933).
12 In Re Williams, 187 N. Y. 286, 79 N. tE.1019 (1907) ; Cf. Pond v. Harrison, 96 Kan. 542, 152 P. 655, L. R. A. 1916 B. 1264 (1915).
" SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) Sec. 157.5.
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there is no clear answer. So much depends upon the
actual effects produced by permitting them, the effects
both economic and sociological upon the community and
upon the beneficiaries of such trusts, and so much depends
upon whether these effects are deemed desirable or otherwise".14 However, he goes on to indicate that when a wife
or child is suing for support none of the reasons which are
generally advanced to exclude creditors are applicable.
For the law of spendthrift trusts developed to protect the
beneficiary against ordinary contract creditors and not
other types of claimants. 5 Accordingly it is extending the
law unduly in the direction of an already favored instrument of the law, the spendthrift trust, to hold that where
a wife or child is concerned the interest of the beneficiary
is still unreachable.
In arriving at the result that income from a spendthrift
trust was reachable by a wife or child suing for maintenance the authorities have advanced varying theories. Illinois, 6 New Hampshire," and Pennsylvania' s have held
that the settlor intended the income from such a trust to
cover support of the wife or child. In other words that
the beneficiary's wife and children, equally with the beneficiary, were to be considered within the settlor's bounty.
This being the intent of the settlor, the effect of the decisions in these jurisdictions has been to vest in the wife or
child a right of action against the trustee. 9 Public policy
in some instances has been so strong that it has been held
that even though it can be seen that the settlor intended
to exclude the wife and child, nevertheless these claimants
are not barred.2" New York, on the other hand, has held
11Ibid., Sec. 152.
15Ibid., See. 157, 157.1.

10 England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922) ; Keller v. Keller, 284 II.
App. 198, 1 N. E. (2d) 773 (1936) ; Futtle v. Grunderson, 254 Ill. App. 552
(1929).
17 Eaton v. Lovering, 81 N. H. 275, 125 A. 433, 35 A. L. R. 1034 (1924).
18 In Re Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802, 52 A. L. R. 1251

(1927).
19In California it has been held that where creditors are allowed by
statute to reach the "surplus" income from the trust, the needs of the
wife and children are considered in determining the amount of surplus.
Magner v. Crooks, 139 Cal. 640, 73 P. 585 (1903).
See also the New York
case of Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N. Y. 520, 44 N. E. 169 (1896), where the
wife was allowed to reach all of a trust income of $5,000 where it appeared
that the husband bad an independent income of $10,000 a year.
20 Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. S. 578, 172 A. 36 (1934) ; Keller v. Keller,
1 N. E. (2d) 773. Contra, Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 266 N. W.
161, 197 Minn. 432, 267 N. W. 426 (1936); Schwager v. Schwager, 7th C.
C. A., 8 U. S. Law Week 319, noted (1940) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 758; (1940)
53 Harv. L. Rev. 1059.
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that the wife or child may reach the husband's or father's
beneficial interest in the trust as creditors.21 Both of these
views are but legal legerdemain employed by the courts to
palliate the fact that they are really making an exception
to the general immunity of spendthrift trust income in
favor of the public policy calling for support of a wife or
child.22 In the words of Professor Griswold, "it would appear to be more satisfactory for the courts to recognize
frankly that recovery by the wife or child represents '2a8
limitation on the generality of the spendthrift trust.
Such a limitation needs no such extended excuses when it
is remembered that spendthrift provisions themselves did
not receive unanimous approval at their inception in American law.24 They are of too recent recognition in Maryland
for the law to crystallize in favor of excluding all classes
of claimants without careful consideration of the problem
by the courts. 5 Professor Scott has suggested a third or
intermediate point of view that might be taken in these
cases. He argues that the wife and child should not be
precluded from reaching the beneficiary's interest but that
they be permitted to reach it only to the extent that may
appear to the court as reasonable under the circumstances.
Of course much can be said in behalf of this position. Actually, no harm results to anyone if this view obtains. And
the court, which is in an excellent position to determine
the best interests of the parties, can allocate funds for the
wife's support and simultaneously aid public policy.
There is ample analogy in other than spendthrift trust
cases to support the right of the wife or of the child to recover for maintenance. Many cases allow the wife to reach
income paid the husband as veteran's compensation where
by Federal statute such income cannot be reached by
21 Oberndorf v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 208 N. Y. 367, 102 N. E.
534 (1913).
22 In further carrying out the public policy concept, courts have upheld
assignments by the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust of a part of his
interest for the purpose of providing for his wife's support. Wright v.
Leupp, 70 N. J. E. 130, 62 A. 464 (1905) ; In Re Yard's Estate, 189 N. Y.
Supp. 190, 116 Misc. 19 (1921). In this latter case a statute was involved.
"Where the trust Is created for the support of the beneficiary, it has been
held that the fact that he has dependents is to be taken into consideration
in determining the amount to which he is entitled under the trust, that the
support of a person Includes the support of those whom it is his duty to
support." SCOTT, TRuSTS (1939) Sec. 157.1.
23 GRSWOLD,SPENDTHRIFT TRuSTS (1936) Sec. 334.
2, GRAy, RESTAINTS ON AIENATION (2d ed., 1895) IX.
25
The earliest Maryland Case is Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497,
15 A. 92 (1888).
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creditors generally.2 6 There are also those decisions and
statutes which do not give the general exemptions from
execution to proceedings to enforce the payment of alimony or support.2 7 Thus, the position of the wife is favored
and protected in those instances where by general statutory law the husband's income is not within reach of the
general creditors. No sound basis of distinction exists between these cases and those where the husband's income is
held to be beyond the grasp of creditors because of a legal
contrivance designated as a spendthrift trust. The rule
should be general to the effect that the wife's and child's
dependent position is such that the law favors them and
allows them always to partake in the husband's or father's
income regardless of its source.28
In relation to the substance of the issue, no difference
in results should be reached because of the technical nature
of wife's or child's suit. Thus whether the suit is one for
alimony or support, on the one hand, or to recover for
necessities, the result should be the same.2 9 In those cases
outside of Maryland where the issue has been raised in
terms of a suit on an alimony decree, the better authority
allows the wife to recover.30 In doing so, these opinions
recognize the true nature of the wife's or child's suit,
namely, that it is a suit for support by a dependent, and
accordingly adjudicate the wife's and child's rights in
terms of the substantive nature of the issue.
As time passes, it is probable that a greater and greater
number of courts will allow the wife or child to reach the
income from a spendthrift trust. Likewise, it will become
26 Stone v. Stone, 188 Ark. 622, 67 S. W. (2d) 189 (1934); Hollis v.
As to amenability of police penBryan, 166 Miss. 687, 143 So. 687 (1932).
sions see Monck v. Monck, 172 N. Y. Supp. 401, 184 App. Div. 656 (1918).
27 Willen v. Willen, 121
Cal. A. 351, 8 P. (2d) 942 (1932); Walker v.
Walker, 204 N. C. 210, 167 S. E. 818 (1933), a minor child; Caldwell v.
see also 50
Central of Georgia By. Co., 158 Ga. 392, 123 S. E. 708 (1924)
L. R. A. (N. S.) 697; 11 A. L. R. 123.
2s Professor Griswold points out that two states have statutes to this
effect, Missouri and Pennsylvania, GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, Sec. 341.
See also RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS TENTATIVE DAr No. 2 (1931) 124.
- See for discussion De Rousse v. Williams, 181 Iowa 379, 164 N. W. 896
(1917). Eaton v. Lovering, 81 N. H. 275, 125 A. 433, 35 A. L. R. 1034
(1924) gives a full discussion of the law, but allows recovery.
3' England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922) ; GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT
TaUSTS, Sec. 339, states that, in New York. while the wife's legal standing
may be no better than that of any other creditor nevertheless as a practical
matter she recovers. Moore v. Moore, 208 N. Y. 97, 101 N. E. 711 (1913) :
Hoagland v. Leask, 138 N. Y. Supp. 790, 154 App. Div. 101 (1912), aff'd
(mem.), 214 N. Y. 645, 108 N. E. 1096 (1915); Fink v. Fink, 248 N. Y.
See also Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56, 18
Supp. 129, 139 Misc. 630 (1931).
S. W. (2d) 859 (1929); Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N. W. 715
(1910). See also Scorr, TRUSTS (1939) Sec. 157.
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decreasingly important that the wife is basing her suit on
an alimony or support award, or that third parties are
suing to recover for necessities advanced to the wife or
child. It is to be hoped that the Maryland Court will not
be overpowered by the inertia of past decisions dealing
with spendthrift trusts to the extent of accepting as law
their failure to state an exception not necessary to their result. It would be better policy to fall in line with the
sound view of public welfare to the effect that a wife or
child in a suit whose real nature is one for support may
reach the income from a spendthrift trust.
ENFORCEABILITY OF FOREIGN DECREES FOR
ALIMONY OR SUPPORT
Bauernschmidt v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.'
As pointed out in the previous note, this case presents
the question whether Maryland will, treat as alimony an
award of money by a California decree, confirming a separation agreement, which was effective as an award of alimony in California, when the Maryland Courts have failed
to consider such a decree rendered in Maryland as the
equivalent of an award of alimony. The Maryland Court
of Appeals refused to give this effect to the California decree, saying, in essence, that since Maryland refuses to give
this effect to its own decrees, the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution does not require that a
foreign decree be given more effect than a similar decree
of the forum. In support of this contention the Court of
Appeals relied on two earlier decisions which had refused
to consider a judicially ratified separation agreement as
the equivalent of an award of alimony.2 While the decision, therefore, as indicated in the preceding note, resolved
itself into a determination of the attachability of the income from a spendthrift trust under this particular type
of foreign decree, there is suggested the problem of the
general enforceability of foreign decrees for alimony or for
support.
The relief at law seems to be fairly well determined by
the United States Supreme Court holdings; and their bind1176 Md. 351, 4 A. (2d) 712 (1939). The same case is noted in the
preceding casenote on another point.
2 Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387, 58 A. L. R. 634 (1928)
Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929).

